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Abstract of paper:  
 
This paper will examine the claim that personal autonomy is impaired by a paradigmatic 
instance of serious psychopathology—namely, the condition of being delusional—in light of 
the hierarchical conception of personal autonomy. This conception of personal autonomy 
aims at yielding value-neutral judgements about freedom and self-governance. I will argue 
that when viewed from the perspective of this specific conception of autonomy, delusions do 
not necessarily impair an agent’s personal autonomy. In order to establish this claim, I will 
probe the general idea that delusional subjects are beset by a mental disease that is rationally 
incapacitating, to which the hierarchical theorist might appeal. I argue that, understood within 
the parameters set by the commitment to value neutrality, this idea fails to provide support 
for the claim that delusion necessarily impairs personal autonomy. One contribution this 
paper makes to the effort of understanding how delusion impairs personal autonomy is to 
help us pinpoint the ways in which our value commitments inform our judgements of impaired 
personal autonomy in delusional agents. 
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Delusions and Personal Autonomy  
 
I. Introduction 
This essay will examine the claim that personal autonomy is impaired by a paradigmatic instance of 
serious psychopathology—namely, the condition of being delusional—in light of the commitment to 
sustain a value-neutral understanding of personal autonomy. This commitment is most commonly 
discharged by employing the hierarchical or reflective-endorsement conception of personal 
autonomy. Central to this conception is a picture of the autonomous agent as one who reflectively 
endorses or disavows her mental states (taken to include volitional, affective, and cognitive states), 
and whose standing as a self-governing agent derives precisely from this act of reflective 
endorsement. The reflective stance adopted by the agent towards her mental states is shaped by what 
she values, and these values are taken to determine who she is in a deep and interesting sense, such 
that both the mental states that are endorsed and the endorsing stance itself are understood to be 
expressions of the agent’s real or true self.1 Set against this are the mental states that aren’t endorsed 
and which may be explicitly disavowed by the agent: any exercise of agency that originates from a 
mental state of this kind fails to count as autonomous, according to this conception of self-
governance.2 Crucially, it is in terms of the agent’s own perspective—rather than by reference to 
objective normative standards—that the hierarchical theorist conceives of personal autonomy. The 
hierarchical conception thus regards agents as the principal—if not ultimate—authority with regard 
to assessments of their own self-governance. In this way, it is hoped that value-neutrality is 
maintained in judgements about personal autonomy. 
Based upon the hierarchical conception of personal autonomy, serious psychopathology is thought to 
impair our capacity to direct our own lives in accordance with our values in one of two ways: first, a 
person’s agency is seen to be controlled by affective and volitional states deemed pathological (as in 
the case of the unwilling addict), rather than being governed by what she reflectively endorses; or 
second, the agent’s reflective stance itself is seen to be controlled by mental illness, rather than by 
inner personal reflection informed by the agent’s true values.3 Both versions of the threat presume 
that a meaningful distinction can be drawn between the real self and the elements of illness that 
appear in the agent’s psychological architecture. However, in the former version of the threat, the 
agent is not yet estranged by mental illness from her ‘true values’, the values to which her real self is 
committed. She finds herself incapable of living in accordance with these values, but she knows what 
they are and remains committed to trying to steer her life accordingly.  By contrast, in the second 
version of the threat, the agent is taken to be estranged from her real self in a more radical way: the 
mental illness takes over the agent entirely, producing not just pathological experiences but distorting 
any reflective stance the agent may adopt towards those experiences. It is the claim of estrangement 
in the latter version of the threat that will concern me here, and my focus will be on delusions 
specifically.  
That mental states deemed delusional are not universally disavowed by their subjects is unsurprising 
in light of the possibility of radical estrangement. But what is surprising—and more problematic for 
the autonomy theorist committed to value-neutrality—is that there are agents who reflectively 
endorse experiences that are deemed delusional, who take these experiences to define their sense of 
self over an extended period of time (sometimes even a lifetime), thus spanning both periods in which 
they are psychotic and periods in which they are not. It is difficult to hold, in the latter phase, that the 
psychotic state distorts the agent’s entire perspective since the agent reflectively endorses his 
delusional experiences in a clear sighted (i.e. non-psychotic) state.4 Cases like this challenge the 
assumption that an agent will necessarily retrospectively disavow the values and the experiences that 
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guided him whilst psychotic, therein precluding the possibility of always being able to appeal to 
agents’ clear sighted reflective endorsements and disavowals to shed light on how delusions impair 
personal autonomy.   
Given this difficulty, and in the hope of upholding in value-neutral terms the claim that delusions 
overcome the agent’s entire perspective—thereby necessarily undermining his autonomous 
standing—the autonomy theorist might seek instead to supplement the hierarchical conception of 
personal autonomy by appealing to the general idea that delusional subjects are beset by a mental 
disease that is rationally incapacitating. The aim of this paper is to evaluate this proposal. The 
discussion will proceed by surveying the most prominent ways of connecting the concepts of delusion 
and impaired autonomy in general terms, as follows: first by reference to the notion of disease, then 
to the notion of rational incapacity, and finally to the notion of anomalous experience. In each case, 
the guiding idea is that delusions—in virtue of being a disease, or being rationally incapacitating, or 
being rooted in anomalous experience—skews an agent’s reflective endorsements in such a way that 
undermines his standing as an autonomous agent.  
To anticipate: I suggest that none of these candidate notions can discharge the task assigned to them. 
My main focus will be on the notions of rational incapacity and of anomalous experience. I argue that 
the notion of rational incapacity becomes serviceable to the hierarchical theorist only if he relies on a 
value-laden understanding of what it means to be autonomous. More specifically, I argue that the 
hierarchical theorist will have to embrace what I call a perfectionist conception of autonomy—
according to which the value of rational capacity is placed at the apex of the axiological network in 
terms of which self-governance is constituted and assessed—in order to assert that being delusional 
necessarily undermines personal autonomy. Likewise, I show that construing anomalous experiences 
through the lens of pathology, and on this basis taking them to undermine an agent’s personal 
autonomy, involves making a significant evaluative decision. If this is right, then given his commitment 
to articulating a value-neutral conception of personal autonomy, the notions of rational incapacity 
and of anomalous experience turn out to be unavailable to the hierarchical theorist as a resource for 
justifying this claim of necessity.   
The hierarchical conception of autonomy seems to be the only available way to sustain a value-neutral 
understanding of self-governance. What the arguments put forward in this paper suggest is that the 
value-neutral autonomy theorist must concede that being delusional does not necessarily undermine 
an agent’s autonomous standing. Where an agent reflectively endorses his or her delusional 
experiences, consistently over time and even when clear sighted, the agent counts as autonomous by 
the lights of the value-neutral theorist’s conception of personal autonomy. If this conclusion is deemed 
unacceptable, then one contribution this discussion makes to the effort of understanding how 
delusion impairs personal autonomy is to help us pinpoint the ways in which our value commitments 
inform our judgements of impaired personal autonomy under the condition of being delusional. 
Alternatively, the considerations to be presented here may compel us to rethink the assumption that 
being delusional always and necessarily impairs personal autonomy. This would signify a striking and 
important revision to our understanding of the relationship between serious psychopathology and 
freedom. In line with much of the philosophical literature in this area, Owen, Freyenhagen et al (2009) 
assume that the norms of psychiatric practice should be taken as the fixed point and that we should 
adopt a theory or conception of personal autonomy that anchors and justifies this practice.5 To this 
end, they conclude in favour of a substantive, value-laden conception of autonomy over a procedural, 
value-neutral one. But this is an assumption that comes under pressure for those who seek to maintain 
a value-neutral stance in making judgements about personal autonomy and freedom.  
 
 
II. Rationality, capacity, and autonomy 
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Before turning to the notion of rational incapacity, it would be helpful to begin by addressing the idea 
that delusions are symptomatic of a mental disease, because much of our thinking about rational 
capacity in delusion is influenced by this particular conception of delusion. In the General 
Psychopathology, Karl Jaspers succinctly summarises this picture of psychosis as disease, stating that 
psychoses spring from disease processes.6 Describing this view more recently and with reference to 
the contemporary debate, Gordon Claridge writes: “Conventional interpretations of psychosis ... are 
essentially modelled on notions of disease as neurological deficit.”7 Importantly, the putative 
malfunctioning of the brain is envisaged as being so serious as to generate extraordinary disturbances 
of the mind – disturbances that leave their subjects rationally incapacitated. It is in these terms that 
psychotic experiences have tended to be interpretatively framed.8  The prospect of anchoring 
psychosis in the notion of rational incapacity caused by biological dysfunction is germane to the 
present discussion because it holds out the promise of preserving the idea—in naturalistic, value-
neutral terms—that being delusional undermines our standing as autonomous agents.  
This approach is beset by both empirical and conceptual difficulties. Any biological markers that are 
found to be systematically correlated with psychosis can only be understood to have autonomy-
impairing significance within the context of a theory that explains how psychosis constitutes biological 
dysfunction and how this biological dysfunction, in turn, erodes a person’s capacity for self-
governance. But there is at present no such biological account of functional psychoses.9 In the absence 
of any account of psychosis—and thus of delusion—as biological dysfunction, it would be vacuous to 
speak of delusion as a biologically rooted mental disease. So it does not seem possible to rely on 
biological notions of dysfunction to establish rational incapacitation in functional psychoses. The 
primary question for the value-neutral autonomy theorist is thus whether, in a delusional state, one’s 
rational capacities per se can be held to be so far impaired as to skew one’s reflective endorsements 
in such a way that undermines one’s standing as an autonomous agent. It is to this question that I will 
now turn.10  
 
(a) The gap between rational capacity and personal autonomy 
 
To appreciate the distinctiveness of delusion, it is helpful to note that the term ‘psychosis’, under 
which the concept of delusion is subsumed, is a broad one. It includes— disjunctively and in addition 
to delusions and hallucinations—disorganised thinking and speech, catatonic behaviour, and 
avolition.11 By definition, disorganised thinking rules out the capacity for engaging in deliberation and 
reflection, a pre-requisite for formulating a viewpoint that is expressive of autonomous agency. 
Likewise, catatonic behaviour and avolition imply a paucity of agency that is underpinned by reflective 
commitment, given the paucity of any expression of agency at all. But these criteria are disjunctive to 
delusions – and delusions themselves, as Jaspers observed a century ago, do not obliterate the 
delusional agent’s critical faculties. Far from it, the agent’s rational capacities seem to be sufficiently 
preserved to be “put into the service of the delusion. The patient thinks, tests arguments, and counter-
arguments in the same way as if he were well.”12 Jaspers adds that a delusional system can be 
constructed “which in its own context is comprehensible [and is] sometimes extremely closely 
argued.”13 
Reviewing the contemporary debate nearly ninety years later, Jose-Luis Bermudez observes that 
“many delusional schizophrenics ... manage to construct a remarkably consistent and coherent view 
of the world. Apparently recalcitrant data are fitted into the web of delusional belief, their 
consequences noted and assimilated.”14 Thus unlike a person who is delirious or one who suffers 
severe memory loss, a delusional subject can be capable of engaging in reasoning and forming a 
distinct viewpoint on the world and on her experiences that she reflectively endorses. Indeed, in the 
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case of chronic, stabilised and elaborated delusions, a delusional agent can explain with clarity, 
internal consistency, and thoughtfulness why she is committed to the delusional outlook. The lucidity 
of the agent’s commitment to this outlook is radically unlike the rapid changes in direction of thought 
and incoherent reason-giving in delirium.  To capture this striking feature of delusional thinking, 
Bermudez identifies a notion of rationality that is rooted in the concept of consistency, which he terms 
‘procedural rationality’.15 An agent who is procedurally rational has the capacity to reason in 
accordance with the formal principles of the logic of consistency. Delusional agents who are capable 
of lucidly articulating their delusional outlook and providing reasons for reflectively endorsing this 
outlook seem to be rational in this sense, and on the basis of his survey of empirical findings, Bermudez 
does indeed conclude that a delusional agent can be procedurally rational.16 
The claim that rational capacities are incapacitated in delusion thus tends to refer to the connection 
between the concept of delusion, on the one hand, and notions of truth, justification, and evidence, 
on the other. Indeed, the bizarre character of delusional thinking, combined with a manifest 
imperviousness of the delusional subject to counter-evidence, is widely taken to be a defining mark 
of such thinking.17 Bermudez notes that although delusional beliefs have been characterised in 
numerous ways, all accounts “share an emphasis on the imperviousness of delusional beliefs to 
countervailing evidence, however overwhelming that countervailing evidence might seem to a third-
person observer.”18 Bermudez then goes on to summarise the relevance of this feature of delusions 
to the notion of rational capacities: “It is fairly clear why this should seem a breakdown in rationality. 
Rational believers must be sensitive to evidential considerations and shifts in the balance of those 
evidential considerations.”19 Bermudez uses the term ‘epistemic rationality’ to refer to this ability to 
form and to update our beliefs in light of the evidence available, distinguishing it from procedural 
rationality. Thus in the context of assessing rational decision-making capacity in delusional subjects, 
the focus tends to be placed on the notion of epistemic rationality, i.e. on truth- or justification-
theoretic characteristics of delusion.20 
This notion of rational capacity maps neatly onto substantive conceptions of autonomy that define 
autonomous agency in terms of an agent’s responsiveness to the norms of truth and goodness.21 If an 
essential part of what it means to be an autonomous agent is to be able to revise our beliefs in light 
of the evidence available to us, then a delusional agent would be straightforwardly precluded from 
counting as autonomous, given that epistemic irrationality is an essential feature of delusionality.22 
However, it is less clear how if at all this notion of capacity maps onto value-neutral conceptions of 
autonomy that are anchored in the notion of reflective endorsement or, as Adrienne Martin puts it, 
in the notion of “consistency across one’s values hierarchy and how one acts in relation to that 
hierarchy.”23 Martin points out that capacity defined in terms of epistemic rationality may even be at 
odds with autonomy conceived in these terms. This point becomes especially apparent in a situation 
in which an epistemically irrational agent wholeheartedly endorses his delusional outlook. Given his 
wholehearted commitment, it will not be possible for the agent to abandon the delusion that lies at 
the heart of that outlook without also sacrificing an important reflective commitment. Take as an 
example a delusional agent who believes that trees speak to him and experiences a sense of 
communion with the natural world on this basis. It may not be possible for this agent to revise this 
(delusional) belief, in accordance with the norms of epistemic rationality, without thereby abandoning 
his sense of communion with the natural world that he enjoys and wholeheartedly endorses. Since it 
is not at all obvious that the notion of epistemic rationality is conceptually connected to that of the 
ability to adopt a reflective stance towards one’s lower-order mental states, Martin (who favours this 
conception of personal autonomy) suggests severing the concepts of rational capacity and autonomy 
altogether. On Martin’s account, an agent who is rationally incapacitated can nonetheless remain 
autonomous.  
Recall, however, that we are considering here the suggestion that the value-neutral autonomy theorist 
could vindicate the claim that delusions undermine personal autonomy by appealing to the concept 
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of impaired rational capacity. The option of severing the concept of rational capacity from that of 
autonomy, which Martin advocates, is thus unavailable to the value-neutral theorist at this point. This 
leaves value-neutral theorists with the following challenge: to spell out why, given the hierarchical 
conception of autonomy, any reflective commitment rooted in gross epistemic irrationality should for 
this very reason be discounted from being an expression of genuine autonomy.  
 
(b) Perfectionism 
To begin to address this challenge, it is helpful to notice that contained within the challenge is the 
assumption that gross epistemic irrationality occupies the same justificatory position as delirium, 
disorganised thinking, and severe memory loss in our schematic understanding of the way serious 
cognitive impairment undermines personal autonomy. Each of these conditions is assumed to be 
sufficient for viewing an agent’s autonomy as grievously undermined. The failure to achieve 
autonomous standing is more apparent in the cases of delirium, disorganised thinking, and severe 
memory loss because a person does not manage to formulate a distinct viewpoint at all, let alone one 
that is reflectively endorsed. Thus in contrast with the delusional agent, there is not even an 
appearance of there being someone—an autonomous agent or person—who values and prefers and 
whom on this basis decides. Nonetheless, in spite of the varying ways in which the conditions on 
autonomy fail to be satisfied, the overall failure to achieve autonomous standing is taken as read 
across all these cases. On what grounds then does this claim stand, namely that gross epistemic 
irrationality occupies the same justificatory position in the ascription of autonomy status as delirium 
and severe memory loss?  
The claim is made intelligible by the value placed by the community on epistemic rationality itself. It 
is only within a community that places a high premium on epistemic rationality that the idea becomes 
intelligible that its erosion or absence could constitute a condition that undermines self-governing 
agency. Moving from intelligibility to a justification, however, involves more than acknowledging that 
epistemic rationality is deeply valued. It involves according a unique status to epistemic rationality 
since we are appealing to it in order to withhold the ascription of autonomy status to someone in 
whom a hierarchy of values is weaved into a recognisable and distinct viewpoint, but who manifests 
gross epistemic irrationality on account of being delusional. To say of such an agent that she fails to 
be genuinely self-governing requires, on the part of the community, a commitment to a particular 
organisation of a range of values, according to which highest value is placed on being epistemically 
rational.  
In practice, organising values in this way would involve taking the value of epistemic rationality to 
trump other things that we recognise as having great personal significance—including personal 
fulfilment, finding a sense of purpose and meaning in life, perhaps even spiritual awakening—since 
delusions, especially ones that are systematic, chronic and elaborated, often become a central 
organising principle in a person’s life and can provide the agent with a sense of personal fulfilment. In 
certain cases, this happens because the delusion comes to signify a change of perspective for the agent 
that is spiritually meaningful.24 (This is an important point to which I shall return in the final section 
below).  
While there may be good reasons for placing great emphasis on epistemic rationality, prioritising it 
above all other things it is possible to value is antithetical to conceptions of autonomy that aim at 
being value neutral. In his exegetical essay on JS Mill’s liberalism, Richard Arneson criticises Dworkin’s 
conception of liberalism for prioritising rationality over all other values, stating that rationality is “a 
value we have no more reason to impose on an adult against his will for his own good than we have 
reason to impose any other value on paternalistic grounds.”25 Typically at this point delusions are cited 
as an exception to this general condition, but this qualification tends to be anchored in the supposition 
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that the disease conception of delusions is well established.26 Given that this supposition continues to 
be contested today for good empirical and conceptual reasons (as noted above), it would be rash of 
the autonomy theorist to privilege the disease interpretation of psychosis over all other 
interpretations. Without assuming the disease interpretation, however, it is not at all clear that 
chronic and stable delusions that are reflectively endorsed by their subjects ought to be treated as an 
exception to the liberal principle articulated by Arneson. Indeed, that is exactly the point that is being 
pressed here: we have, as yet, no sound rationale for treating delusions as an exception. It may be 
countered that delusions are so severely epistemically irrational that they wear their pathological 
mark on their sleeves, as it were. There is no need to prioritise the value placed on epistemic 
rationality above all other values, in order to insist that a basic degree of epistemic rationality is 
necessary for the exercise of genuine autonomy, since the delusional agent fails to manifest even this 
degree of epistemic rationality. But the difficulty with this response, as noted by Martin 2007 (see 
section above), is that it is not clear in what way epistemic rationality is necessary at all for the exercise 
of genuine autonomy, conceived of in terms of reflective endorsement.  
It seems to me that the only way of making sense of this claim of necessity is to view rationality (this 
includes epistemic rationality) as an excellence or a virtue that is cultivatable and that ought to be 
cultivated in agents in order for them to count as truly free and self-governing agents. To be 
committed to this claim, however, would be to adopt a perfectionist, rather than a prudential, view 
of autonomous agency – and perfectionism presupposes a value substantive conception of freedom. 
This point merits elaboration. The terms ‘prudential’ and ‘perfectionist’, as I am using them here, are 
borrowed from the debate about conceptions of well-being, but there is a close analogue between 
freedom and well-being that makes these terms useful in understanding the pressure placed by this 
counter-response on the value-neutral conception of autonomy. According to the prudential 
conception of well-being, an agent is the ultimate (if fallible) authority about how well her life is going 
for her. Being epistemically rational may not sit at the zenith of an agent’s value hierarchy, and this 
fact will have a bearing both on how she governs herself and on her assessment of her own well-being. 
Analogously, according to the prudential conception of autonomy, an agent succeeds in governing 
herself if she lives a life that coheres with—or is expressive of—her most deeply-held values, 
regardless of what these values happen to be. She is the ultimate (if fallible) authority not just about 
what matters most to her, but also about what should matter most to her. Summarising the difference 
between the two conceptions of value (prudential vs perfectionist) with reference to well-being, Larry 
Sumner writes: “A life has prudential value if it is going well for the individual whose life it is. A life has 
perfectionist value if it displays the excellences appropriate to the kind of individual whose life it is.”27 
Analogously, we may say that an agent is self-governing, by prudential lights, if she is managing to live 
her life in accordance with her most cherished values. By contrast, an agent is self-governing, by 
perfectionist lights, if an agent displays the excellences that are essential to self-governance and 
freedom, excellences that are specified in an agent-independent way (i.e. without reference to what 
individual agents happen to value). 
The gap between epistemic rationality and autonomy, hierarchically construed, can be plugged only 
by adopting a perfectionist conception of autonomy because it is only by appealing to the notion of 
epistemic rationality as an excellence that we could begin to see why it is at all relevant to the 
autonomy-constituting reflective endorsements we make of our lower-order mental states, let alone 
necessary for it. In effect, we need to view certain instances of reflective endorsement but not others 
as manifesting human excellence (i.e. human excellence is manifested only in those instances of 
reflective endorsement that are epistemically rational), and to embed this view within a framework 
that makes such excellence a precondition on autonomous agency. In moving the locus of authority 
away from the individual agent and placing it in an ideal standard of freedom, instantiated through a 
stipulated range of excellences, a perfectionist conception of autonomy ceases to be value-neutral. 
Thus any justification of the claim that being delusional undermines one’s autonomous standing which 
rests on perfectionist grounds is antithetical to the hierarchical theorist’s value-neutral conception of 
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autonomy. Without moving the locus of authority away from the individual agent though, it is not at 
all clear why epistemic rationality is at all relevant, let alone necessary, for governing ourselves by 
exercising our agency in a manner that is consistent with our most deeply-held values (epistemic 
rationality simply may not figure in an agent’s set of most deeply-held values).  
A perfectionist conception of autonomy can also be problematic in a more specific way: if we adopt 
the perfectionist stance just towards delusional agents alone, and not towards adults generally, the 
delusional agent suffers from a burden that is asymmetrically and unfairly imposed. Of any two adults 
who do not seem to prioritise epistemic rationality above all other things in their hierarchy of values, 
if just one of the two adults is deemed to be delusional, it would be unjust to demand a perfectionist 
standard of (and thus to withhold the ascription of autonomy status to) the delusional adult only. But 
the demand for a perfectionist standard across the board is precisely what value-neutral autonomy 
theorists reject.  
Against this more specific worry about double standards, it may be argued that the degree of 
irrationality in a delusional outlook is distinctively severe and in this way serves to mark out the 
delusional agent from agents who manifest epistemic irrationality but are not deemed delusional. In 
other words, the suggestion here is that the irrationality manifest in delusions is significantly more 
capacity-impairing than the various forms of irrationality that non-delusional agents ordinarily 
manifest, which explains why the epistemic irrationality instantiated in the former case does 
undermine an agent’s autonomous standing, whereas it does not in the latter case. In sum, this move 
consists in the adoption of a perfectionist view of autonomy but seeks to contain the perfectionist 
standard just to delusional agents, whilst retaining a value-neutral conception of autonomy in the case 
of non-delusional (normal) agents, in a manner that is consistent and fair. The question I now want to 
consider is whether there are principled reasons for this containment.  
 
(c) Epistemic irrationality in delusions and in ordinary life 
In order to move from the observation that delusional individuals are epistemically irrational to the 
conclusion that their capacity to self-govern is undermined by this fact, it is vital to establish that non-
delusional individuals are not similarly irrational since it is normally granted that the latter are self-
governing agents. As it turns out, there are strong empirical grounds for holding that ordinary (non-
delusional) adults are just as disposed as delusional adults to manifest errors in reasoning that violate 
epistemic and procedural norms. That is to say, both delusional and non-delusional adults are 
disposed to manifest epistemic irrationality. If the severity of epistemic irrationality is matched across 
the delusional group and at least some members of the non-delusional group, then the fact of their 
epistemic irrationality would not constitute grounds for withholding the ascription of autonomous 
agency to individuals in the delusional group, whilst we continue to view epistemically irrational 
individuals in the non-delusional group as autonomous.  
So are delusional individuals systematically more epistemically irrational than at least some non-
delusional individuals? This contention does not seem to be borne out by available empirical evidence.  
Reviewing the patterns of epistemic irrationality observed in delusional individuals, Bermudez 
identifies three prominent patterns:  
1. It is characteristic of delusional patients not to entertain the possibility that the delusional 
belief might be false. 
2. Delusional patients either fail to engage in such a search [for evidence] or filter out any non-
confirmatory evidence.28 
3. Delusional patients are notoriously poor at considering the probability of the datum to be 
explained in the absence of the explanatory factor put forward.29 
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All three patterns have been observed in the non-clinical population too, most notoriously in the 
confirmation bias.30 Furthermore, in the non-clinical population, these patterns are observed not just 
in the case of mundane and unsurprising beliefs, but also in the case of bizarre ones too.31 Now, the 
bizarre beliefs that non-delusional individuals can sometimes hold with rigidity—impervious to 
counterevidence—have been hypothesised to stem from a person’s emotional needs.32 This raises an 
interesting question about the way we conceive of freedom in relation to beliefs that are tenaciously 
held. Whether or not the specific hypothesis about emotional needs turns out to be true, there seems 
to be an asymmetry in our judgements of personal autonomy between, on the one hand, someone in 
the nonclinical population who tenaciously holds on to a belief because of an emotional need (or other 
predisposing factor), and on the other hand, a delusional person who does so. Both agents manifest 
epistemic irrationality in Bermudez’s sense, and at least in certain cases do so to the same degree. 
Why then do we take the delusional person to be in the grip of the delusion in such a way that 
undermines his agency, whilst not viewing the ordinary (nonclinical) person as being in the grip of an 
emotional need in a similarly autonomy-undermining way? Without presupposing the disease 
conception of psychosis, this asymmetrical judgement seems an arbitrary one to make.33  
A further possibility for the hierarchical theorist is to appeal to the non-ordinary or anomalous states 
of consciousness that are taken to be essential to the formation and maintenance of delusions, in 
order to establish (in value-neutral terms) the claim that delusions skew one’s reflective 
endorsements in such a way that undermines one’s standing as an autonomous agent. This option will 
be explored next.  
 
III. Anomalous experiences in delusion  
Brendan Maher has long argued that delusional beliefs are rational inferential responses to anomalous 
experiences.34 Jaspers a century ago similarly insisted that what is primary in delusional ideation is not 
the truth-value of the delusion (nor its often bizarre character), but rather the “transformation in the 
subject’s total awareness of reality,” the notion of awareness here being construed experientially.35 
The salience dysregulation hypothesis—currently an influential way of understanding what happens 
experientially in psychosis, especially schizophrenic psychosis—corroborates the Jaspers-Maher view 
of the primacy of anomalous experiences in delusion formation and maintenance.36  
Could the claim that delusions undermine a person’s autonomous standing be justified by appealing 
to this experiential aspect of delusions? Some authors have attempted to establish the claim in this 
way, doing so by appealing to anomalous experiences that invoke negative affective responses (for 
instance, a subject feels watched and starts to feel threatened, or a subject begins to feel as though 
she is dissolving—becoming physically insubstantial—and panics as a result). Both the distress 
experienced by the subject and the reflective disavowal that ensues provide grounds for just such a 
justification. Thus drawing on Elyn Saks’ memoir (in which Saks describes responding to anomalous 
experiences in this way), Mackenzie and Poltera (2010) suggest that mental illness impairs capacities 
required for what they call self-narrative construction, i.e. the capacity to integrate one’s self-
experience into a coherent self-narrative. This forms the basis for the authors’ claim of impaired 
autonomy in mental illness.37  
But not every delusional agent suffers a loss of this capacity for integration (whether through self-
narrative or by other means). On the contrary, anomalous experiences seem sometimes to facilitate 
an enhanced sense of being integrated, as shown in the qualitative study conducted by Glenn Roberts 
(op. cit.). Another example, reported by Lukoff (1985), captures this possibility succinctly:   
Throughout her [psychiatric] hospitalization, another person in the midst of a similar 
[psychotic] episode told the staff, “Listen … I’ve had this incredible mystical experience.” 
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Today she writes, “Now, more than eight years later, I can look back and say, ‘Listen …. I had 
this incredible mystical experience.’ It integrated and made sense of everything that had ever 
happened to me or that I had ever done. It showed me the meaning and purpose of life. It was 
a birth into a state of consciousness I did not even know existed, but which is now a permanent 
part of my life.”38 
This divergence in possibilities suggests that it is not the fact of the anomalous experience itself, but 
rather the distress that can be associated with such experiences, and the subject’s response to this, 
that results in impaired autonomy. The impairment here may be due to the experience of distress that 
is reflectively disavowed, as well as the obstruction that this poses to an agent’s capacity for 
integration (through whatever means), as just noted. The value-neutral autonomy theorist can 
embrace this account of how autonomy is impaired in a delusional state, but this account refers to the 
state’s distressing quality, rather than its delusional quality, since delusion in and of itself isn’t 
necessarily distressing. Furthermore, this fact about distress is not unique to mental illness: any 
distress, if severe enough, can disorientate a person and unravel the threads of a self-narrative that 
served her well up to that point — whether this distress is caused by physical/mental illness, or by 
significant personal loss, for instance. To anchor the claim that delusions undermine personal 
autonomy, it would have to be shown that it is the anomalous experience itself, rather than the 
concomitant distress that can accompany it, that impairs an agent’s autonomy.  
Once the delusional outlook, based in anomalous experience, is disentangled from the distress 
condition however, it is not clear that an appeal to anomalous experience itself can be used to ground 
the claim of impaired autonomy in delusional agents. It is a familiar point that the significance of 
experience, anomalous or otherwise, stands open to interpretation,39 and so it should come as no 
surprise to discover that anomalous experiences can shape the course of human lives in such a variety 
of ways. One important way in which this familiar point shows up in the context of delusions is in the 
difficulty of disambiguating so-called psychotic experiences from purportedly spiritual or mystical 
ones.40 Exploring this difficulty from a neutral standpoint is not easy, but a helpful way in is by noticing 
that phenomena such as hallucinations41 and delusions42 occur with surprising frequency in the 
nonclinical population – and these anomalous experiences are sometimes reported as playing an 
adaptive role in the lives of the individuals who experience them. By the lights of recent DSM editions, 
these individuals in the nonclinical population would count as psychotic since the diagnostic criteria 
for psychotic illnesses such as schizoaffective disorder and schizophreniform disorder require just two 
experiential features deemed psychotic (delusions and hallucinations), present for a duration of at 
least two weeks and a month respectively, and requiring no impairment in social/occupational 
functioning. Thus according to these criteria, it is possible for a highly functional individual to end up 
counting as diagnosable with a psychotic illness on account of experiencing hallucinatory and 
delusional experiences for an extended period of time (as those with chronic, stable, and elaborated 
delusional systems do).43 The crucial question here is whether the DSM criteria effectively stipulate 
that all anomalous experience of delusional and hallucinatory varieties must be viewed through the 
lens of psychopathology, a stipulation that overlooks available alternative interpretations of these 
experiences and is thus open to the charge of being overly inclusive.  
There are two variants of this worry worth distinguishing from each other:  
(1) The criteria used to determine that delusions are pathological seem also to capture valid 
spiritual experiences.  
(2) Of any given anomalous experience, it is often difficult to determine whether it is psychotic 
(thus pathological) in character or whether it is instead a spiritual or a mystical experience.  
Beauchamp and Childress register the first challenge in their discussion of the concept of autonomy,44 
and Stanislav Grof expresses this worry about the over-inclusivity of the DSM criteria for psychosis in 
the following terms: “Mainstream psychiatrists are unable to see a difference between psychospiritual 
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crises, or even uncomplicated mystical states, and serious mental illness, because of their narrow 
conceptual framework.”45 
The second variant of the worry points to the indeterminate nature of anomalous experiences relative 
to the significance it is possible to ascribe to them. One reason why it is difficult to determine the 
character of an anomalous experience—as pathological or non-pathological—is that such experiences 
are often very similar across both categorisations, in form and in content.46 Another reason for the 
difficulty in distinguishing pathological from non-pathological anomalous experiences, alluded to a 
moment ago, is the fact that anomalous experiences do not necessarily give rise to distress. Freeman 
and Garety have found that rather than being associated directly with the anomalous experience itself, 
distress arises depending on how the individual makes sense of this experience, i.e. her appraisals.47 
Separately, Grof – who coins the term ‘spiritual emergency’ to refer to experientially difficult stages 
of spiritual opening and of a radical personality transformation – suggests that a subject’s attitude to 
this crisis and her experiential style significantly determines the course of the experience as it unfolds 
in time. Those who are open to “experiential work and interested to try it” may, Grof suggests, 
interpret these anomalous experiences as signifying a psychospiritual crisis out of which can develop 
“psychosomatic health, increased zest for life, a more rewarding life strategy, and an expanded 
worldview that includes the spiritual dimension of existence.”48 The observation made by Freeman 
and Garety, and separately by Grof, is corroborated by findings in a qualitative study conducted by 
Jackson and Fulford (1997). The authors conclude:  
The cases reported in the present study [cases of nonclinical individuals who have had 
anomalous, psychotic-like experiences] show ... that psychotic phenomena may be, in and of 
themselves, good. And whether they are spiritual (good) or pathological (bad) depends 
ultimately not on some subtlety of their phenomenology (the focus of traditional 
psychopathology), but on the way in which they are embedded in the structure of values and 
beliefs by which the actions of the subjects concerned are defined. In the case of pathological 
psychotic phenomena, there is a radical failure of action. ... In the case of spiritual psychotic 
phenomena, action is radically enhanced. ... Instead of there being “literally no action” 
(Fulford 1989, ch.10), the individual is empowered.49 
If the significance of anomalous experience—or a subset thereof—is interpretatively porous, being 
open at least to either a pathological or a spiritual interpretation, then the prioritisation of the medical 
interpretation over alternative interpretations stands in need of a justification. Seen from the 
perspective of theorists of autonomy who wish to remain impartial to this interpretative debate, the 
inclusion of delusions/hallucinations in the diagnostic criteria for psychotic conditions would appear 
to presuppose rather than to establish the pathological nature of these anomalous experiences. The 
circularity here is problematic: it gives rise to the worry that any anomalous experience could be 
judged pathological merely by the inclusion of that experience type in the diagnostic criteria for a 
mental disorder – a problem underscored by the history of the conceptualisation of homosexuality as 
a mental illness. (Cf Craigie 2011 for an analogous concern about the diagnostic criteria for anorexia 
nervosa).50 Avoiding this circularity requires us to adopt an interpretatively neutral stance according 
to which anomalous experiences are not automatically read as pathological.  This points us to the 
following conclusion: the claim of impaired autonomy in delusional agents cannot be grounded in an 
appeal to anomalous experience given the interpretative porousness of such experience and the 
availability of several interpretative possibilities, just one of which casts it as pathological. 
In addition to this worry about circularity, the threat of perfectionism lurks here too. The 
interpretative debate about the significance of anomalous experience underscores the fact that such 
experience—especially ones that are termed delusional—can contribute to a person’s sense of 
purpose and existential meaning, enabling her to feel subjectively fulfilled and therein to enjoy 
newfound wellbeing.51 The general assumption that epistemic rationality and existential meaning are 
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at least mutually complementary, if not deeply intertwined, thus seems to break down here – and 
unless we are perfectionists about personal autonomy, it is not obvious that greater value should be 
placed on epistemic rationality than on existential meaning. To put this last point more precisely:  it is 
not obvious that someone who places greater value on existential meaning than on epistemic 
rationality should, for this reason, be deemed not to have the capacity to govern herself and to direct 
her life in accordance with her most deeply held values.52  
Having surveyed the most prominent candidates for connecting the concepts of delusion and impaired 
autonomy in general terms—i.e. disease, incapacity due to irrationality, and anomalous experience—
and found that none readily provides a value-neutral justification for the claim that the condition of 
being delusional itself undermines an agent’s autonomy, it might be useful to consider the 
implications of this conclusion for the notion of authenticity. For closely related to the picture of the 
delusional subject being held in the grip of psychosis is the idea that psychosis is an entity that is 
necessarily external to the subject – and thus, that even if a delusional outlook is reflectively endorsed, 
it remains an inauthentic commitment on the part of its subject. In order for this idea to stand, we 
need a way of demarcating the boundary between what is properly internal to the self and what is 
external to it. If the conceptualisation of psychosis as a disease were a well anchored one, this would 
provide us with a promising route, given the familiar notion of disease as an entity that is external to 
the self. But we have seen that there is no conclusive grounds for this conceptualisation of psychosis. 
The appeal to irrationality is likewise unpromising given that it threatens to encompass instances of 
irrationality in non-delusional and delusional agents alike. This may not matter from the perspective 
of a long-standing tradition of viewing a person’s disposition to be irrational as an external force that 
directs the person’s choices, a disposition that is “alien to the self.”53 But as Arneson points out, this 
tradition presumes the prioritisation of rationality above all other values, a hierarchical organisation 
that we have no reason to suppose is universally endorsed. Value-neutral theorists should hence be 
cautious about equating inauthenticity with irrationality. In cases where a delusional subject reports 
deeply valuing her delusional outlook, there thus appears to be no way to separate the delusional 
outlook from the true self, such that the outlook can be said to be external to this self. But without a 
criterion by which to demarcate the boundaries of the self—and to place psychosis firmly outside the 
self—the assumption that a reflectively endorsed delusional outlook is inauthentic remains 
unsupported. Indeed, if anything, an agent’s reflective endorsement of a delusional outlook seems 
more authentic than ordinary endorsements, because of the intersubjective resistance faced by 
delusional agents and the depth of commitment they demonstrate to this outlook in having to 
navigate this resistance (no threat of brain-washing or social conditioning here).54  
 
 
IV. Conclusion 
The purpose of this paper has been to underscore the elusiveness of a value-neutral characterisation 
of the claim that being delusional necessarily undermines our ability to live our lives by our own lights, 
to govern ourselves in accordance with what each of us most deeply values. We continue to wish for 
two things, which turn out to be inconsistent if the foregoing considerations are accepted: 
 
(a) Firstly, that we can conceive of other people as being autonomous even if we disagree with 
each other over what matters most – that is, that there is a value-neutral conception of 
personal autonomy available for us; and 
(b) Secondly, that being delusional (a psychotic state that lies at the heart of traditional 
psychopathology) necessarily impairs our ability to exercise autonomy.  
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These two wishes sustain the ideal of articulating a non-paternalistic account of how human autonomy 
can be impaired by psychosis. The challenge is to explain how Claim (b) is true, and the hope is that 
we will be able to employ the conception of autonomy in Claim (a) to explain the truth of Claim (b) in 
value-neutral terms. To date, no attempt at articulating such an account has been forthcoming (see 
e.g. Hope 2004 and Szmukler 2016).55 The diagnosis offered in this paper for the elusiveness of a non-
paternalistic account is this: the hierarchical theorist’s value-neutral conception of autonomy 
identifies the locus of autonomy in an agent’s sense-making activities, i.e. in our attempt to interpret 
our experiences in light of our values. Being delusional does not put a stop to sense-making. Humans 
carry on trying to make sense of their experiences even when diagnosed as delusional, and they can 
do so with remarkable coherence and clarity.  
 
It may be true that what we most deeply value may change as a result of having a psychotic mental 
disorder, but this alone isn’t grounds for saying that our personal autonomy is impaired by this serious 
mental illness. Other life-transforming conditions such as losing a loved one or becoming a parent can 
also bring about a change in our sense of self and what we most deeply value, and here we haven’t 
the least inclination to say that bereavement or parenthood necessarily impairs our autonomy. So we 
will need to find something unique to the nature of delusion that has this debilitating effect, to 
establish that being delusional necessarily impairs personal autonomy, but the only way to do this 
seems to involve an appeal to our substantive values. Should we find such an appeal unacceptably 
paternalistic, then we must begin to see delusional agents in a new light, i.e. seeing that, in and of 
itself, being delusional does not preclude an agent from being autonomous and free. To quote Henry 
Cockburn, diagnosed with schizophrenia in his early twenties, “I think I just see the world differently 
from other people, and maybe if psychiatrists understood this, I would not have been in the 
hospital.”56 If we wish to remain steadfastly non-paternalistic and committed to a value-neutral 
framework for personal autonomy, the foregoing considerations presented in this paper suggest that 
we would have to concede this: Henry Cockburn sees the world differently from other people, but this 
in itself doesn’t make him any less autonomous than the rest of us.  
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